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Authoritarianism endures through a bargain enforced by state power: economic stability, identity, and protection for those who comply, repression, exclusion, and fear for those who do not. As the United States polarises and faith in democratic institutions erodes, this dynamic is no longer distant. When I wrote this essay in 2019, I examined the Middle East. Today, the themes are more relevant than ever, and much closer to home. The number of global democracies has grown steadily over the last 50 years, but in the Middle East authoritarian leaders have remained stubbornly in power. This study will discuss conditions that, if not necessarily required for democratic transition, increase the chance of success. Kamrava’s idea of the “Authoritarian Bargain” is vital; examining why it has endured in much of the Arab world despite faltering in similar circumstances globally. The Authoritarian Bargain is summarised perfectly as: “(an) implicit social contract between the Saudi royal family and the Saudi Arabian citizens…the government controls nearly the entire economy and employs two thirds of the workers, providing lavish subsidies and jobs in exchange for an authoritarian political system.” The region’s exceptional factor is the availability of oil and gas reserves, controlled and operated by the state, guaranteeing solvency to uphold the Authoritarian Bargain. Populations remain safe and content, accepting an authoritarian system backed by a robust security apparatus that affords fewer freedoms than democratic models would allow. The question is also what happens if solvency is threatened and the bargain cannot be upheld? Many factors help to create conditions for democracy which is: “so complex an outcome that no single variable will ever prove to be universally necessary or sufficient for it” Common factors hamper democratic transition; easily accessible economic resources dominated by the state, lack of elite cohesion and civil society, limited globalisation, low literacy rates, geographical location compared to other democracies, and robustness of security apparatus with the will to deploy it when the regime is threatened. Of paramount importance is the causes and effects of continued interference by foreign actors, and the bitter divisions between Sunni and Shi’ia, hampering efforts to coalesce domestically in opposition, but also providing a pretext for interference from other Arab States in the region. Much scholarship has unfortunately focused on the falsehood that Islam is intrinsically opposed to democracy, and this study will first address and dismiss this reductive notion. The “Orientalist” fallacy Through much of the twentieth century, discourse centred on the premise that Islam was innately anti – democratic. Popular works like Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” claimed that Islam was diametrically opposed to Western values including democracy, viewing them as “materialistic, corrupt, decadent and immoral” with a “secularity and irreligiosity worse than Christianity.” Kedourie claimed that “oriental despotism” was inseparable from the region, and democratic political institutions are “profoundly alien to the Muslim tradition.” Thankfully this reductive assessment has been widely discredited; with no empirical evidence existing of a correlation between Islamic and non-democratic beliefs. Scholars have subsequently proven; Democracy and Islam are not mutually exclusive, that strikingly similar attitudes toward democracy exist in the West and Islamic world, Islam is a smaller influence on political attitudes than suggested, and that it is not the obstacle to democratization as claimed. Religion does not drive politics, but it is often interpreted by actors for political means, including subverting democracy or furthering autocracy; for example the monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, whose rulers claim lineage to the prophet Muhammad to legitimise their rule in times of trouble. In Iran, Supreme Leader Khomeini, and now his successor Khamenei, use the same tactic to distance themselves from unpopular political decisions of the ruling government. In reality their role is clearly political and influence is obvious, a fact recognised by protestors in recent years. Availability of Hydrocarbon reserves and ease of extraction Easy access to economic resources is a key factor in the longevity of authoritarian regimes; in this region it is easily extractable hydrocarbon reserves. It is no coincidence that the Gulf monarchies are amongst the longest enduring authoritarian regimes in the world and were least impacted by the Arab Spring, they benefit from large and easily extractable hydrocarbon reserves coupled with relatively low populations, creating perfect conditions for authoritarian bargains. Saudi Arabia’s economy is dominated by this single industry; 85% of export earnings, 31% of GDP in 2016 and a massive 90% of government revenues are derived from it. The world’s second largest oil reserves, and unlike Venezuela with the largest but deep offshore, they are easily accessible and thus incredibly profitable. As Venezuela struggles in poverty, the hydrocarbon powered Saudi economy ensures the authoritarian bargain remains. In the UAE (seventh largest gas reserves) the government lavishes benefits on its limited number of Emirati citizens; tax free income, free healthcare and higher education, generous pensions, interest free loans to build homes, and an incredible 90% of all employed Emiratis being employed by the State. In Oman there exists a strict “Omanisation” strategy to drive employment of the indigenous population in the hydrocarbon industry, with a target of 86%. The stability of these regimes and the durability of the bargain is intrinsically linked to global demand for oil, which is already causing issues. In the UAE, attempts are being made to grow the private sector to reduce reliance on the state, expanding alternative sectors like construction and tourism. In Kuwait (6 th largest reserves) a drop in oil price has led to a re-evaluation of the previously guaranteed benefits provided by the State. In Saudi Arabia the ambitious Vision 2030 involves a complete overhaul of the economy, anchored by the much delayed and problematic Saudi Aramco floatation, already showing this will have its challenges. Interestingly these moves to expand the private sector may strengthen the economy, but weaken the authoritarian systems themselves, as a private class is created independent from the state. A “state monopoly on coercion” Skocpol emphasised the importance of a “state monopoly on the means of coercion”, which if able to remain: “coherent and effective, (it) can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy…and even a pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects.” This is a common feature in the region through the presence of a “Robust security Apparatus…exceptionally able and willing to crush reform initiatives from below.” In this region the security apparatus of authoritarian states are one of the largest employers (men under arms per thousand); with Saddam’s Iraq (20.94),Syria (26) and Bahrain (33.8) standing as clear examples when compared to democracies like France (6.31) and Brazil (3.92). The region, buoyed with hydrocarbon revenues, also spends the most globally on defence (relative % of GDP), with seven states responsible for 40% of global arm purchases in the year 2000. When the economy does suffer, authoritarian leaders with total control of fiscal policy, will prioritise maintaining payment of the security apparatus to ensure loyalty and maintain their hold on power. Patrimonialism within the security apparatus reinforces a symbiotic relationship, rendering political reform deadly for the rulers but also the “prospect of ruin for the elite of the coercive apparatus.” These systems reward loyalty rather than the meritocracy seen in institutionalised systems. Nepotism and cronyism, often along tribal lines, create a “strong personal linkage between the coercive apparatus and the regime it serves,” especially vital in those states such as Syria, Saddam’s Iraq, and Bahrain, where the ruling sect represents the minority of the population as a whole. It is commonplace for members of the ruling family or tribe to be installed throughout the security apparatus, explaining appointments such as the Syrian Air force Commander with no prior experience as a pilot. Some regional states have institutionalised security services, ostensibly prioritising legitimacy and service to country rather than personal aggrandisement. It is interesting to analyse recent events in states described by Bellin as highly institutionalized; Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia. In Turkey, the military often enforces regime change via coups, and in 2016 this almost occurred again. President Erdogan is criticised for taking further steps toward autocracy since the failed coup, carrying out an unprecedented purge of suspected political enemies in every aspect of Turkish life; a move away from institutionalism. Electoral setbacks are leading to political imprisonments, and his legitimacy is weakening, but it is difficult to predict how this unfolds; if he abandons the pretence of democracy and overtly attempts to mimic the Autocratic systems of his neighbours, will the newly purged military attempt to stop him? In Egypt, the military views itself as a legitimate tool of the people, and this was vital in Mubarak’s toppling, when the army refused to fire on protesters during the mass protests in 2011, hastening his departure. This contrasts with the actions of more patrimonial security services in other states. In Syria, Assad clung to power with the aid of a loyal security service and an estimated 120,000 Syrians have died in the ensuing civil war and In Libya, Gaddafi’s security services used force against the protesters with estimates of up to 50,000 killed during the “revolution”. In Iran, the revolutionary guards have permeated all areas of society, and violently crushed protests in 2009 and 2012. In Saddam’s Iraq the security services were notorious for their cruelty and packed with loyalists. Institutionalised security services are preferable to patrimonial, but no guarantee of political freedom. In Egypt, this highly institutionalised security apparatus launched a coup in 2013 to overthrow a democratically elected government, imprisoning its elected prime minister, and banned his victorious Muslim Brotherhood party as a terrorist organisation. During the coup the military broke the vow made just two years earlier; killing supporters of the ruling party with live fire. Lack of popular mobilisation for political reform Bellin, cites the lack of popular mobilisation on behalf of political reform and the success of the Iranian revolution is used as proof of this theory, stating that: “High levels of popular mobilization in Iran raised the cost of repression sufficiently to undermine the coercive apparatus’ will to repress ”. This was later contradicted in some fashion by the Arab Spring just 5 years later. Beginning in Tunisia, protests spread throughout the Arab world; amongst the highest levels of popular mobilization ever witnessed. Whilst the “will to repress” was undermined in some states like Egypt (briefly) and Tunisia, the violent response to the protests by many regimes show the limits to this theory. This is further evidenced by the fact that in Iraq, Libya and Syria, where the security apparatus in each state was renowned for loyalty and willingness to use force - authoritarian regimes would still be in power unopposed were it not for international intervention. Excepting Tunisia, this incredible display of popular mobilisation resulted in very little tangible progress toward democratization. Even in Tunisia, the democratic transition is imperfect; political corruption continues as many of the previous regime’s officials remain in power, fraud is widespread, and crime has increased with little fear of the police post revolution. Sunni and Shia and no “elite cohesion” to create Civil Society Kamrava cites the initial absence of the elite cohesion required to create a civil society as a key factor in this question, but in many states in the region, especially the gulf monarchies, the elite are content and thus have no desire for change. Crucially absent is a “political Society”, defined as : “That arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus.” The repressive reaction to any autonomous groups working independently from the state is a common feature in the region, and absence of ‘civil society organisations’ is correctly noted as a contributory factor. The animosity between Shi’ia and Sunni has also created instabilities within domestic populations; reducing the chances of consensus, a vital ingredient of democratic transition. In Iraq, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, efforts to transition to democracy have reverted to internecine arguments once difficulties arise. This animosity also has a wider impact as domestic revolts morph into pan-Arab sectarian conflicts, with regional actors battling for influence and furthering instability. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the largest actors here, and the civil wars in Syria and Yemen are the clearest examples of this. Globalisation, Literacy and Geography Low levels of globalisation reduce the spread of communication and ideas of political reform. The internet is the ultimate example of increasing Globalisation and the importance of spreading information via social media is widely credited as one of the main features of the Arab Spring, although sometimes overstated. It was a useful tool toward democratic transition, but not sufficient to be independently causal. Low literacy rates are intrinsically linked to poverty and common in the region, inhibiting the creation of a political class, but Bellin counters this claim with the successful democratic transitions of Botswana, Mauritius and India, all suffering similar levels of poverty and literacy. The importance of this is further reduced by the rise of social media, which bypasses traditional methods of information sharing, requiring no literacy skill required. Bellin also cites Geographical location comparative relative to other democracies, but correctly dismisses this as a determining factor; other regions geographically remote from democracy have flourished . Today the internet is everywhere, and with global, instant communication, physical location is even less inhibitor to the spread of ideas than when Bellin wrote in 2004. Foreign Intervention Foreign powers are also responsible for the endurance of authoritarian regimes in the region. The colonial interlude is responsible for the limited social cohesion and political class in many Arab states; colonising powers crushed any indigenous political movements threatening their dominance. Western powers have remained active; first in the cold war against communism, and now against Islamic terrorism. Repressive regimes have been maintained by US tax dollars as part of successive questionable strategic policies; Egyptian autocracies received $2 billion annually as foreign aid, for example. In Iran, a democratically elected government was overthrown by a CIA backed coup, proof democracy is acceptable only when outcomes align with US strategic. Antagonism toward Iran, one of the few democracies, however imperfect, in the region, counters the stated goal of spreading democracy. Efforts at moderation and engagement have been met with inconsistency, most recently with the unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Committed Plan of Action. One could question whether there are those within the US political class still guided by Huntington’s disproved theory. US support for the Bahraini regime, as the home of the 5 th Fleet, lends legitimacy to the ruling party and reduces the chances of successful revolution. In Saudi Arabia, human rights abuses are ignored as arms sales and regional opposition to Iran are deemed more important. In Yemen, popular uprising has become civil war as the US has outsourced influence to Saudi Arabia, resulting in war crimes committed with US weaponry. In Libya the decision to intervene in the civil war was short sighted, and a failed state now exists. The chaotic conditions in Iraq, after the disastrous and illegal invasion of 2003 are widely documented and require no further explanation here. If society is not ready to transition, and the movement is not generated from within, democracy will struggle to take root, with allegiances reverting along traditional tribal or religious lines. These examples of foreign interference in the region have clearly been counterproductive; democracy cannot be enforced at the barrel of a gun. Conclusion There is no single reason for the enduring power of authoritarian leaders in the Middle East, but the availability of oil and gas reserves is of greatest importance. It provides the fiscal strength for authoritarian bargains to hold, supporting mostly patrimonial Security systems, and governs the actions of interfering external states. It is impossible to predict the future chances for greater democratization in the region; globalisation is occurring rapidly but the power to transform is limited, as seen by the false dawn of the Arab Spring. Improved communication and access to information should be useful in this regard, but with it lies problems with “fake news”, and state sponsored misinformation which have proven damaging even in mature democracies. As the world weans itself off oil, states which do not realign their economies may find the strength of their authoritarian bargains weakening, but this is no guarantee that democracy will flourish. Some states co-opt religion to maintain legitimacy, but ultimately the most successful autocracies use an effective combination of state support and repression to maintain their authoritarian bargains; one cannot succeed without the other.
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