How effectively had the US dealt with the threats to stability posed by Iran and Iraq since 1979?

In 2020, I wrote my second major essay - a deep dive into a question that remains as pressing today as it was four decades ago: “How effectively had the US dealt with the threats to stability posed by Iran and Iraq since 1979?” 

The paper argued that Washington has often been the architect of the very instability it claims to confront - from orchestrating the 1953 coup in Iran and arming Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War, to the 2003 invasion of Iraq that shattered regional order and gave rise to ISIS and now, strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. 

Tracing the arc from the Iranian Revolution to the Gulf Wars and today’s renewed tensions, the essay revealed a pattern in which U.S. policy doesn’t just respond to instability - it plays an active role in creating it, then uses the resulting chaos as justification to tighten its grip on the region.

How effectively had the US dealt with the threats to stability posed by Iran and Iraq since 1979? 

Patrick Watts, 2020

This question requires separating regional from global stability; although posing many regional issues,  arguably the global threat from either nation has been minimal. It is certainly a success that neither  state has developed WMDs or invaded a neighbor since Kuwait in 1991. Through Desert storm and the  dual containment strategy, the US dealt effectively in managing threats to stability, but through the Iraq  war and unilateral abandonment of the Joint Comprehensive plan of Action (JCPOA), they did not. 

Iran 

Understanding difficulties between the US and Iran requires comprehension of a complicated history.  For Khoemini and the revolutionaries of 1979, it was logical to blame the US for the 1953 CIA sponsored  coup, and decades of repression by their “puppet” Shah Pahlavi. For many Iranians the US embassy  seizure was rational; a quid-pro quo to redress past grievances. For the US, the 444 day hostage crisis of  1979-1981: “…burned itself into the popular imagination and became part of the political landscape.”  This has shaped subsequent US policy, narrowing the diplomatic options available. Complicity in  International terrorism led to President Reagan labelling Iran an “outlaw state”, and this categorization  continues in subsequent US administrations through; Clinton’s “Rogue State policy”, George W Bush’s  “axis of evil” and Trump’s Iranian Revolutionary Guard designation as foreign terrorist organization.  

Iran/Iraq War 

Although US policy during the conflict was officially to remain detached, through covert actions both  sides were supported militarily; not prudent for stability. The Iran/Contra affair entailed US arms sales 

to Iran in direct contravention of US congress, whilst Iraq was supplied with arms and military advisors,  including precursors to biological weaponry. The downing of Iranian air flight 655 (03/07/1988),  resulted in 290 civilian deaths; a serious, albeit accidental misstep by the US, still impacting relations  today. The only notable success was exerting enough pressure to ultimately convince the Iranians to  accept a ceasefire based on UNSCR 598 and end to hostilities. 

Desert Storm 

This US led, limited aim, military action to protect Kuwait, enjoyed unprecedented international support, achieving every strategic aim intended at outset. Economically crippled by the Iran war, Iraq invaded oil  rich Kuwait on 02/08/1990. Left unchallenged, Iraq would control 20% of global oil reserves, with Saudi  

Arabia a possible future target, unacceptable at a time when the US imported over 50% of its oil.  The US wisely ensured that force was not first resort; before any military action there were numerous  Security council resolutions, economic sanctions and embargoes, all failing to curb Iraqi aggression.  Parallel to these diplomatic efforts, the US skillfully build a coalition resulting in 800,000 troops amassing  in Saudi Arabia under operation “Desert Shield”, and worked to ensure battle readiness and cohesion  amongst this multi-nation force, an achievement not to be overlooked. Evidence of brutality filtered  out of Kuwait, some accurate some fabricated, international opinion hardened and military action was  agreed. A devastating 40 day air assault crippled Iraqi military infrastructure, and the ground campaign  

was a rout; defeat within just 100 hours for the region’s most feared military, partly due to inept Iraqi  military commanders without air cover, and mass desertions.

Undoubtedly a tactical victory, Bush’s assessment was correct; the aims of the UN security council  mandate were met, the unity of the coalition including Arab partners remained intact (partly due to US  insisting Israeli non-intervention after Scud missiles were launched into Israel), UN legitimacy  enhanced, US legitimacy not reduced by mission creep, and Iraq avoided disintegration into a failed  state. Some believe the action did not go far enough, describing this as both strategic failure and  missed opportunity. Bush clearly hoped that the military action would cause an uprising to enact regime  change, appealing directly to Iraqi military and civilians to overthrow the dictator,  and as Divine claims,  the design of the ground offensive was evidence of the true goals: 

“ a deadly blow to the Iraqi army…not only to liberate Kuwait but to decimate the Republican Guard  (and)…drive Saddam from power.” 

At the very least it is difficult to argue against the decision not to remove the offensive capabilities of  the remaining Iraqi army; helicopters and armoured units were subsequently used to brutally quell  uprisings by the Kurds in the North and Shia in the South. 

Dual Containment 

After Desert Storm, “dual containment” was adopted to manage threats from Iran and Iraq, resulting  from “clear headed assessment” that both regimes were hostile to US interests, and traditional balance  of power policy was defunct in an age of overwhelming US military superiority. Economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure were intended to isolate both regimes internationally, but policy critics highlight its rigidity, lack of regional support and misassumption of US capacity to influence regional  events. This can be countered by stating that this strategy did manage the Iranian threat to stability; limiting military activity to proxy forces in regional conflicts, and leading eventually to the successful  curtailing of the Iranian WMD program via the JCPOA in 2016. The policy was arguably successful in managing Iraq until the decision to invade in 2003, although critics correctly assert that sanctions aiming  to cripple Saddam Hussein were ineffective, instead devastating the Iraqi population. 

The Iraq war  

Although Iraq spent much of the period between Gulf wars obstructing UN weapons inspectors, there  was insufficient justification for the invasion in 2003. Cheney falsely claimed containment to be a  failure as there was : “no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction”.  Failure to locate WMDs is proof that Cheney was incorrect; containment, had in fact prevented this  outcome. US failures in Iraq are too numerous to expand fully within the constraints of this study.  Illegal US led action in Iraq led to 288,000 violent deaths, the rise of ISIS and regional instability. The  absence of any post-war reconstruction plan, delayed comprehension of the requirements of a  successful COIN campaign, a de ba’athification policy and disbanding of the army, caused a power  vacuum leading to chaos; internecine violence between Sunni and Shia, and the evolution of Al Qaeda in Iraq to ISIS. ISIS brutalized the Iraqi and Syrian people from 2011 – 2018, and civilian casualties continue during attempts to destroy the terror group. 

JCPOA 

Efforts to moderate Iranian behavior have been successful in parts and Rouhani has won successive  elections on a platform of re-engagement, curbing nuclear ambitions for sanctions relief. The JCPOA achieved this goal; Trump’s unilateral withdrawal is a mistake, evidenced by reports that the order was not based on intelligence assessments, but “diplomatic vandalism to spite Obama.35” This increases the  chance of a direct military conflict, and this unreliability is disincentive to other “rogue states” to deal with the US. Some view Iranian proxies as larger threat to stability than nuclear ambitions, and the  brazen attack on the Saudi Oil refinery  can be viewed as either; direct rebuttal of Trump’s withdrawal  or continued rogue behavior that justifies the decision to disengage diplomatically. US bolstering of regional allies militarily has limited Iranian regional aggression, but at what cost; global reputational  damage through complicity with both war crimes in Yemen  and murder of Jamal Khashoggi, must be weighed against the benefit of a bulwark against Iran. 

What level of stability is considered a success? Should one assess the relative success of any policies  through the prism of maintaining global stability and avoiding direct threats to the security of the Unites  

States? Through containment, Desert Storm, and the JCPOA, the US achieved this goal and reduced  threats to regional and global stability which should have been built upon instead of demolished. An  uncomfortable fact is that subsequent US actions have contributed hugely to destabilization, in not just Iraq and Iran, but also Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

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For the US to remain as global leader, it must evolve.